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ELECTED TO DECIDE:
IS THE DECISION-AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE
OF GREAT WEIGHT DEFERENCE
APPROPRIATE IN THIS COURT OF LAST
RESORT?
THE HONORABLE PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, the state court of last resort for claims
made in Wisconsin forums, provides review "only when special and important
reasons are presented."' In order to control its docket, the court selects
approximately ten percent of the cases presented to it for review each year.2
It accepts those cases that it determines contain significant issues of federal or
state constitutional law,3 where the court is considering establishing a new
policy, 4 where decisions of the court of appeals appear to be in conflict or
show a need to harmonize the law,5 or where the court determines that the
issue presented is otherwise of statewide concern. 6 The court limits its docket
because it sees itself as a law-declaring, not an error-correcting, court.7
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, like other Wisconsin appellate courts,
uses a variety of doctrines, such as deferential standards of review and waiver,
to restrict its ability to fully review the merits of decisions made by other
* Patience Drake Roggensack is a justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and a former judge
of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Justice Roggensack is a 1980 University of Wisconsin Law
School graduate.
1. See Wis. STAT. § 809.62(1) (2003-2004).
2. See Supreme Court Statistical Reports, 1994-2004.
3. See Dane County Dep't of Human Servs v. P.P., 2005 WI 32, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d
344.
4. See In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d I10 (concluding that
interrogations of juveniles that are conducted in a secure setting will not be admissible unless
recorded); State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 592 (concluding that most
show-up, eye-witness identifications are no longer admissible).
5. See State v. Higginbotham, 471 N.W.2d 24 (Wis. 1991).
6. See § 809.62.
7. See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3; State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 1 39, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 39, 604
N.W.2d 517, 39.
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tribunals. 8 These doctrines do not arise from any constitutional limitation on
the court's powers or from legislative proscriptions. Rather, they are
judicially created rules of administration employed in deciding legal issues
that have no underlying factual questions to resolve. They often are driven by
concerns for the efficient use of judicial resources, the finality of judgments,
and the asserted expertise of other tribunals. 9
The use of decision-avoidance doctrines has grown dramatically over the
last twenty-five years, to the extent that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
routinely defers to the decisions of other tribunals, without examining and
explaining how the law requires the result reached.' 0 In this Article, I frame
appellate review, generally outline the effect of decision-avoidance, and focus
more specifically on its use by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the review of
state agency decisions. I also suggest that because the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's members were elected to decide what the law is, and because the
court restricts its own docket in order to maintain its law-declaring status, it
may be appropriate for the court to re-examine whether decision-avoidance is
too often replacing the court's full consideration of the issues raised on
appeal, at least in regard to state agency decisions to which the highest level
of deference, great weight deference, is accorded.
II. APPELLATE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Appellate review is provided to afford the parties the benefit of a
collective judicial opinion to more effectively assure a fair and equitable
result that follows relevant legal principles." In a court of last resort, judicial
review also has a law-declaring function because of the court of last resort's
position as the final arbiter of the legal question presented. Thorough
appellate review is a time-consuming process. It involves review of factual
records that are often voluminous; extensive legal research of the laws of
Wisconsin, of federal laws, and the laws of other states; careful attention to
briefs and to oral arguments of the parties; thorough discussion among
members of the court; and the synthesis of a written opinion that distills the
facts and the law and comes to a reasoned conclusion that is both
understandable and useable by the parties, other tribunals, and the public.
8. See Appendix A, infra, for examples of the judicially created decision-avoidance doctrines
and examples where the Wisconsin Supreme Court has used them.
9. See Beecher v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 88, 23-25, 273 Wis. 2d 136,
23-25, 682 N.W.2d 29, 23-25; Maclin v. State, 284 N.W.2d 661, 664-65 (Wis. 1979).
10. See Appendix B and Appendix C, infra, for the use of judicial decision-avoidance doctrines
in opinions the Wisconsin Supreme Court released in the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 terms.
11. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
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A well-written appellate opinion of the type that the public expects from
the Wisconsin Supreme Court is a carefully forged tool. It is firm,
understandable, and user-friendly when the need arises to apply it in the
future. The court accomplishes these objectives by analyzing the relevant
facts and law and then clearly explaining why it reached the result that it did.
It takes a great deal of work to complete a well-reasoned, effective appellate
opinion. And while some would argue that the court has many other tasks in
addition to completing the reviews of the cases the court accepts, 12 it is its
law-declaring function evidenced in its written opinions that the public most
associates with the work of the court and through which the court makes its
most lasting contribution to the development of the rule of law.
In Wisconsin, appellate review is not a constitutional right, but rather an
opportunity afforded through legislation. The type of appellate review that is
given depends upon the forum in which the claim is first brought, the
statutory provisions that apply to the appeal, judicial interpretations of those
provisions and judicially created doctrines of administration. For example, in
civil cases and criminal cases first filed in circuit court,1 3 appellate judicial
review is accorded under sections 808.03 and 974.02 of the Wisconsin
Statutes. Termination of parental rights cases are provided appellate review
under section 809.105 of the Wisconsin Statutes, and appeals in proceedings
related to parental consent to perform abortions are subject to section 809.105
of the Wisconsin Statutes. On the other hand, cases that are filed with an
agency, such as contested cases brought before the Department of Workforce
Development (DWD) 14 under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA),
are generally appealed first to an agency-commission such as the Labor and
Industry Review Commission (LIRC). LIRC's decision on a WFEA claim
may be reviewed in the circuit court under section 111.395 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, subject to the provisions of chapter 227. The agency decision is
further reviewed when the circuit court's final decision is appealed under
section 808.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes.15 However, LIRC's decisions thatrelate to worker's compensation and unemployment compensation are subject
12. The court also acts as the superintending authority of the judicial branch of Wisconsin
government, WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3, cl. 1, and the supervisory authority for lawyers practicing in
Wisconsin, WIS. SUP. CT. R. 21 preamble.
13. In Wisconsin, circuit courts provide the trial venue for the majority of cases that do not
begin as an assignment to a state agency. See Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 2; WIS. STAT. § 753.03 (2003-
2004). A statutory right of review is provided in the court of appeals.
14. The Department of Workforce Development was known as the Department of Industry,
Labor, and Human Relations from 1967 to 1996.
15. Even though the appeal is taken from the circuit court's decision, it is the agency decision
that remains the focus of the appellate review. See Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 457
N.W.2d 502 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
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to judicial review under the provisions of chapter 102 and not those of chapter
227. 16 Review of the agency decision is then subject to further appellate
review by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals under section 808.03 of the
Wisconsin Statutes on an appeal from the circuit court's decision,' 7 and the
decision of the court of appeals is subject to discretionary review by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
8
The court of appeals provides the statutory review of right under
Wisconsin law, in that most claimants in Wisconsin forums have a
legislatively created right to bring claims as far as the court of appeals.' 9 It is
an intermediate appellate court that has an extremely heavy workload,
deciding approximately 3500 cases annually.20 The court of appeals has had a
300% increase in appeals since it was created in 1978, with only a 33%
increase in judicial resources by which to process its docket. 21 Therefore,
because it has no control over its docket and the need to expeditiously process
a heavy workload, the court of appeals' use of doctrines that limit the extent
of appellate review may be driven by necessity rather than by choice. 2
Accordingly, the court of appeals' use of decision-avoidance doctrines is not
examined in this Article.
However, since the creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in 1978,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has set its appellate docket through the cases it
selects for review pursuant to the criteria set out in section 809.62 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, deciding approximately 100 appeals per term.23 When
the court decides to grant a petition for review 24 or for bypass, 25 or to accept a
certification 26 from the court of appeals, it is the perception of the public that
the court has taken the case to decide the substantive issues presented, not to
avoid deciding them by judicially created avoidance doctrines. In addition,
while I have noted that the scope of judicial review is limited by statute in
some categories of appeals, such as that set out in section 102.23(l)(e) of the
16. WIS. STAT. § 102.23(1)(a) (2003-2004).
17. § 808.03(1).
18. § 808.10.
19. § 808.03(1).
20. See Wisconsin Court of Appeals Statistical Reports, 1978-2004.
21. See id.
22. In some instances, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also has restricted the court of appeals'
ability to review certain issues. See, e.g., State v. Schumacher, 424 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Wis. 1988)
(restricting the court of appeals' review of a claimed error in jury instructions when the issue was not
first raised in the circuit court).
23. See Supreme Court Statistical Reports, 1994-2004.
24. § 809.62.
25. § 809.60.
26. § 809.61.
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Wisconsin Statutes and the directive given in section 227.57 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, my focus is not on those or other statutory limitations. Rather, it is
solely on judicially created doctrines that are employed in lieu of providing a
reasoned decision on the merits of the issues presented. These are doctrines
that preclude a declaration of what the law is by the very court that chose to
accept the cases for review.
III. DECISION-AVOIDANCE IN THE SUPREME COURT
Over time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, like many other appellate
courts, has created a number of decision-avoidance doctrines that, when
applied to cases under review, prevent the court from reaching the merits of
the legal questions presented. These doctrines are formalistic approaches to
decision making that have been developed without persuasively explaining
why their use in each case where they are employed better serves the public
interest than does a well-reasoned opinion that describes how the application
of the law to the facts of the case or the interpretation of a statute causes the
result reached. As doctrines of judicial administration, they are refused 27 or
employed 28 based solely on the choice of the court. Examples of commonly
applied decision-avoidance doctrines are deferential standards of review 29 and
waiver. 30 There are times when decision-avoidance doctrines are employed to
dispose of an ancillary issue presented by a case that the court accepted as a
vehicle to address a different issue. 3' The use of such doctrines is more
understandable there. However, decision-avoidance doctrines are routinely
applied to decide key issues for which judicial review was granted.32 When
27. See Lisney v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 493 N.W.2d 14, 15-23 (Wis. 1992)
(declining to defer to LIRC's interpretation of section 102.42(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes and
instead clearly explaining why the law required the result the court reached).
28. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 539 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Wis.
1995) (applying great weight deference to LIRC's interpretation of section 102.555(8) of the
Wisconsin Statutes).
29. For example, deferential standards of review are employed in the reviews of circuit court
decisions that the court determines are "discretionary" and of agency decisions. See State v.
Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, 7 10, 273 Wis. 2d 57, T 10, 681 N.W.2d 524, T 10; Jicha v. Dep't of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div., 485 N.W.2d 256, 258-59 (Wis. 1992).
30. When the issue was not raised in the court below, the court may deem the litigant's right to
raise it on appeal as having been waived by the litigant. See Maclin v. State, 284 N.W.2d 661, 664
(Wis. 1979).
31. See State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 559 N.W.2d 900, 901, 902 n.6 (Wis. 1997) (explaining
that whether Jacobus waived his right to contest his incarceration by entering an Alford plea was a
side issue to the court's deciding whether the state could criminally prosecute Jacobus for bail
jumping when he violated a condition of his bond).
32. See Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 90, 24, 273
Wis. 2d 394, 24, 682 N.W.2d 343, 24; see also id., 77 50-52, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 7 50-52, 682
2006)
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they are used in this fashion, the public is not provided with an appellate
review that actually examines whether the law was correctly interpreted or
applied by the other tribunal.
What decision-avoidance doctrines accomplish is to relieve the court of
the real work of judicial review, what has been described as the "burden of
reasoned decisionmaking. ' ' 33 Reasoned decision making requires an appellate
court to understand the facts found, to assess the law that may be applied to
those facts given the questions presented for review, and to explain why the
application of the law to the facts produced the decision of the court. It is in
explaining the "why" that an appellate court does its real work because it is
that part of the decision that will best assist the public's understanding of its
rights and responsibilities under the law. However, when deferral to another
tribunal on a question of law controls the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the court merely recites a mantra invoking some level of deference that
is then used as a substitute for analyzing the merits of the legal question
presented. There is no discussion of the facts and how the relevant statutes
bear on them. There is no explanation of why the agency decision accords
with the intent of the legislature in enacting the law under consideration.
Therefore, there is no reasoned decision about whether the law was correctly
applied or interpreted. Indeed, some writers who have examined judicially
created decision-avoidance doctrines have stated that when "the scope of
review is too limited, the right to review itself becomes meaningless." 3
For example, if the decision is one that has been ascribed to the circuit
court's discretion, little if any actual review is provided.35 Circuit court
decisions on the admissibility of evidence,36  the structure of jury
instructions, 37 sentencing, 38 requests for bail, 39 child custody, 40 the award of
maintenance or property division in a divorce, 4' and the award of costs 42 are
all reviewed deferentially by deciding whether the circuit court properly
N.W.2d 343, 50-52 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).
33. The Honorable Mary M. Schroeder, Appellate Justice Today: Fairness or Formulas the
Fairchild Lecture, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 9, 10 (1994).
34. Bernard Schwartz, Some Recent Administrative Law Trends: Delegations and Judicial
Review, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 208, 227 (1982).
35. See Schmid v. Olsen, 330 N.W.2d 547, 551-52 (Wis. 1983) (stating that reviewing courts
should search the record for reasons to sustain a discretionary decision).
36. See State v. Alsteen, 324 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Wis. 1982).
37. See Meurer v. ITT Gen. Controls, 280 N.W.2d 156, 161-62 (Wis. 1979).
38. See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 7 1-3, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 1-3, 678 N.W.2d 197, TT 1-3.
39. See State v. Achterberg, 548 N.W.2d 515, 518-19 (Wis. 1996).
40. See Burger v. Burger, 424 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Wis. 1988).
41. See id.
42. See Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, 19, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 683
N.W.2d 58, 19.
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exercised its discretion. Those decisions will not be overturned if a
reasonable court could have made them.43 Often on review the court will note
that if it had been the first tribunal to decide the issue, it would not have
reached the same conclusion as the first decision-maker. 4 And, even when
the court says that it expects the exercise of discretion to be expressed on the
record and to describe both the law and the facts the circuit court relied upon,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has also held that if the circuit court has not
done so but the record supports the exercise of discretion in the way in which
it appears that the circuit court may have exercised it, the court will affirm the
decision. 45 Applying a deferential standard of review permits the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to affirm a wide variety of circuit court decisions on the same
issue.46
Additionally, even though the court reviews issues of law de novo when a
circuit court's decision is at issue,47 it generally takes a very deferential
approach to an agency's decision on a question of law.48 During reviews
where the court gives deference to an agency's statutory interpretation or the
application of a statute to the facts found, the court applies either (1) due
weight deference, where an agency's conclusion of law is affirmed if it is
reasonable and the court does not deem another conclusion more reasonable,49
or (2) great weight deference, where an agency's conclusion of law is
affirmed even if the court decides that an alternate conclusion is more
reasonable. 50  However, applying an unambiguous statute to a given set of
facts and interpreting a statute can be two very different tasks. For example,
an agency may repeatedly apply the criteria of section 102.18(l)(bp) of the
Wisconsin Statutes to determine whether an employer has exercised bad faith
in refusing to pay benefits, 51 and in so doing, develop a level of expertise that
may warrant deference. However, when an ambiguous statute is interpreted,
the task is to determine the meaning of the legislative enactment. Declaring
what a statute means is a core function of the courts for which an agency has
no greater level of expertise.52 Therefore, the reasons for giving deference to
43. See State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165, 170-71 (Wis. 1988).
44. See Hartung v. Hartung, 306 N.W.2d 16, 20-21 (Wis. 1981).
45. See State v. Pharr, 340 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Wis. 1983).
46. See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635 (1971).
47. See Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co., 361 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Wis. 1985).
48. See UFE Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 548 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Wis. 1996).
49. See id. at 62-63.
50. See id.
51. See Brown v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2003 WI 142, 9, 17, 267 Wis. 2d 31,
9, 17, 671 N.W.2d 279, 9, 17.
52. See Johnson v. Blackburn, 595 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Wis. 1999).
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one type of decision may not support granting deference to the other.5 3
IV. DECISION-AVOIDANCE IN AGENCY REVIEWS
Nowhere are restrictions that avoid a reasoned judicial decision on the
merits more apparent than in the court's review of state agency decisions. In
some instances, the level of deference granted depends on the statutory
scheme for the context in which the case arose. For example, deference is
different for an agency's rule-making decision 54 as compared with an appeal
arising from a contested case hearing55 held by an agency. In a rule-making
review, the court examines the scope of the rule-making authority the
legislature granted to the agency and whether the rule was enacted in
conformity with the statutory rule-making procedures.56 However, on review
of a contested case that resulted from a hearing before an agency, the court
routinely defers to an agency's decision on questions of law, even when the
court concludes that there is another conclusion that is more reasonable than
that chosen by the agency. This is known as great weight deference.57
As an attempt to initiate discussion of the use of judicially created
decision-avoidance doctrines, a topic that can be extremely broad in scope, I
will narrow my inquiry by focusing on reviews of contested cases where great
weight deference has been applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Because
the use of great weight deference in the review of contested cases has evolved
over time, it is helpful to consider some early decisions where agency
conclusions of law were reviewed fully by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In Pabst v. Department of Taxation (Pabst J),58 the court interpreted a
statute, then section 227.20 of the Wisconsin Statutes,59 to determine what
type of an approach it should use when reviewing an agency decision on a
question of law. Section 227.20 of the Wisconsin Statutes contained the
legislative directive about appeals subject to chapter 227. The statute
addressed the standard of review to be applied to factual findings. The court
explained that questions of fact were to be affirmed if the finding of fact was
53. I recognize that it may not always be apparent when an agency is applying an unambiguous
statute and when it is interpreting an ambiguous statute.
54. See WIs. STAT. §§ 227.01(13), 227.40 (2003-2004).
55. See §§ 227.01(3), 227.42.
56. Brown County v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 307 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Wis. 1981).
57. See UFE Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 548 N.W.2d 57, 63 (Wis. 1996).
58. 120 N.W.2d 77, 81-83 (Wis. 1963). I refer to the 1963 decision as Pabst H because of the
1961 decision, Dep't of Taxation v. Pabst (Pabst/), 112 N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1961).
59. Section 227.20 is now section 227.57 of the 2003-2004 Wisconsin Statutes.
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supported by substantial evidence. 60  However, the court held that questions
of law, such as the application of a statute to the facts found, were "always
reviewable by the reviewing court., 61 The court then went on to explain that
section 227.20 of the Wisconsin Statutes required the court to use an
"analytical approach" on review of agency decisions on questions of law
because of the difference in treatment that the statute required for agency
factual findings as compared with agency legal conclusions.62
In Pabst II, the court contrasted the analytic approach, where factual
questions are first separated from legal questions, with the "practical" or
"policy" approach that was sometimes used by the United States Supreme
60. Pabst II, 120 N.W.2d at 82. Sections 227.20(l)(b) and (d) of the 1961-1962 Wisconsin
Statutes established this standard for reviews conducted under chapter 227. Those sections provided
the following:
(1) The court may affirm the decision of the agency, or may reverse or
modify it if the substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced as a
result of the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions being:
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, or
affected by other error of law; or
(d) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as
submitted.
WIS. STAT. §§ 227.20(1)(b), (d) (1961-1962)
Section 227.57(5) and (6) of the 2003-2004 Wisconsin Statutes continue a similar
standard of review. The 2003-2004 version of the statutes provide in relevant part:
(5) The court shall set aside or modify the agency action if it finds that the
agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct
interpretation compels a particular action ....
(6) If the agency's action depends on any fact found by the agency in a
contested case proceeding, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact. The
court shall, however, set aside agency action or remand the case to the agency if
it finds that the agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is not
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
WIS. STAT. §§ 227.57(5), (6) (2003-2004).
61. Pabst II, 120 N.W.2d at 81-82.
62. Id. at 82. The analytical approach to which the court referred is that set out in the
administrative law treatise by Kenneth Culp Davis. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 4
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 189 (1958).
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Court.6 3 The court explained that when the United States Supreme Court used
the practical approach for agency decisions on questions of law, it appeared to
choose to avoid deciding the question that was presented. 64 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court eschewed the practical approach because it interpreted the
relevant statute 65 as requiring "Wisconsin courts to employ the analytical
approach when reviewing agency decisions." 66 However, notwithstanding the
strong statement in Pabst II that an agency's decision on a question of law is
"always reviewable," the court also indicated, in dicta, that deference to an
agency's legal decision was possible for certain types of legal questions. The
court explained that
in fields in which an agency has particular competence or
expertise, [a] court[] should not substitute [its] judgment for
the agency's application of a particular statute to the found
facts if a rational basis exists in law for the agency's
interpretation and [the interpretation] does not conflict with
the statute's legislative history, prior decisions of this court,
or constitutional prohibitions.67
In so doing, the court seemed to indicate the potential to follow the United
States Supreme Court's practical approach where the Court defers to one type
of agency legal decision, the application of a statute to a set of facts, in an
appropriate case.68  However, the court's statement showed it would do so
only after analyzing the legislature's intent, the relevant constitutional
provisions, and whether the agency was "more competent than this court" to
apply the facts found to the law under consideration. 69 The court also said
nothing about another type of legal question that commonly arises: the
63. The "practical approach" gives deference to agencies to make significant policy choices.
See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005).
When applying the law to the facts found, the United States Supreme Court long ago explained that
when the factual record permits the agency to draw a particular conclusion the court's review is
concluded. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939). Currently, the
Court also defers to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute, if the statute is within the
agency's jurisdiction to administer and the agency interpretation is reasonable. See Nat '7 Cable, 125
S. Ct. at 2699.
64. Pabst!!, 120 N.W.2d at 81-82.
65. See Brown v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2003 WI 142, 167 Wis. 2d 31, 671 N.W.2d
279.
66. Pabst II, 120 N.W.2d at 82.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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interpretation of an ambiguous statute.7°
The question presented in Pabst II was whether the facts taken as a whole
proved that the trust was "administered" in Wisconsin pursuant to then section
71.08(8) of the Wisconsin Statutes. The court, using the analytical approach
that required separating the questions to be decided into questions of fact and
questions of law, labeled the issue a question of law.71 Ida Pabst had created
the trust at issue, just as she created the trust that had been addressed by the
court in an earlier decision, Department of Taxation v. Pabst (Pabst 1).72
However, in Pabst I the court labeled the same question, whether the trust had
been administered in Wisconsin, a question of fact.73 In Pabst II, the court
noted the difference in the labels, but it gave no reason for its differing
assessments. Instead, the Pabst II court decided the legal question,
independently, coming to the same conclusion as had the agency.74
As the law continued to develop, the court repeated versions of statements
similar to, yet remarkably different from, those it made in Pabst I: that an
agency's application of a statute to found facts was a question of law that was
always subject to review. In Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Industry,
Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights Division,75 where the question
presented was factual, that is, whether there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the department's finding that the prospective employee was
physically able to safely and efficiently perform the duties of the job which he
sought,76 the court quoted the dicta from Pabst II but with a significant
difference. The Bucyrus-Erie court instructed the following:
The construction of a statute or the application of a statute to
a particular set of facts is such a question of law ...
Although the court is not bound by the agency's
interpretation, some deference must be given the agency in
those areas in which it has specialized knowledge and
70. It should be noted that it is only an interpretation of an ambiguous statute to which courts
defer because if the meaning of the statute is plain on its face there is no "interpretation" needed. See
Lisney v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 493 N.W.2d 14, 15-16 (Wis. 1992).
71. Pabst II, 120 N.W.2d at 81. No one contended that the term "administered" was
ambiguous.
72. Pabst I, 112 N.W.2d 161, 162 (Wis. 1961).
73. Id. at 164-65.
74. Pabst II, 120 N.W.2d at 83 ("Having determined the scope of judicial review applicable in
the instant case, we may now review the board's conclusion of law .... [U]pon review of such facts
we reach the same conclusion of law as did the board when it determined that the trust was
administered in Wisconsin .... ").
75. 280 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 1979).
76. Id. at 146.
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expertise. The court will hesitate to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency on a question of law if ". . . a rational
basis exists in law for the agency's interpretation and it does
not conflict with the statute's legislative history, prior
decisions of this court, or constitutional prohibitions."77
The above quotation was also dicta in Bucyrus-Erie, as was the passage
quoted earlier from Pabst II, but Bucyrus-Erie broadened the statement from
Pabst It in two ways. The court said deference must be given to the agency
on legal issues for which the agency has specialized knowledge and expertise,
and it said that both the interpretation of an ambiguous statute and the
application of the law to the facts found were subject to deference. As I noted
above, Pabst II spoke only to an agency's application of a statute to the facts
found.
In Dairy Equipment Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human
Relations, Equal Rights Division, where statutory interpretation was the legal
issue, the court remarked that it "should not upset the department's judgment
concerning questions of law if there exists a rational basis for the
department's conclusion." 78 However, the court conducted an independent
review to interpret the statutory term. In Milwaukee County v. Department of
Labor, Industry & Human Relations, Equal Rights Division,79 where any
deference that could be accorded to an agency decision appeared to be
grounded in some special expertise that the agency had and the court lacked in
regard to applying the statute at issue, "special expertise" was held not to be
present. Therefore, the court gave no deference to the agency's legal
conclusion that involved the interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 80  The
court has also conducted an independent review of the legal issue and
concluded that the way in which the agency construed a statute had no
rational basis.8t Overall, the court continued to state that in a chapter 227
77. Id. at 147 (quoting Pabst 11, 120 N.W.2d at 82) (citations omitted).
78. Dairy Equip. Co. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div., 290
N.W.2d 330, 334 (Wis. 1980) (concluding after an independent review, notwithstanding the court's
repetition of the deference-mantra, that the court's interpretation of the statutory term "handicap,"
used in the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, includes conditions others perceived as limiting an
employee's ability to work, even if those conditions did not do so).
79. See Milwaukee County v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div.,
180 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Wis. 1970).
80. See id. (concluding that no expertise is needed to conclude whether the undisputed facts
constitute inexcusable delay in making workers compensation payments; therefore, the court gave no
deference to the agency's statutory interpretation).
81. See Am. Motors Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 350 N.W.2d 120, 126 (Wis.
1984) (concluding that a woman of four feet ten inches in height was not handicapped within the
meaning of the WFEA, therefore LIRC's conclusion to the contrary had no rational basis).
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review an appellate court may set aside or modify an agency's legal
conclusion after the court's independent review of the question of law. 82
Then in Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission,83
the court set out the expansive statement of deference to an agency's legal
conclusions that is currently used and it did so by re-characterizing the legal
issue presented. Harnischfeger presented the court with an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 84  In setting the frame for broad
deference to agencies, the court described the legal issue before the court as
deciding what level of deference it should accord LIRC's decision. It did not
characterize the legal issue as the interpretation of an ambiguous statute. The
court said,
Whether or not a court agrees or disagrees with LIRC's
methodology, however, is not the issue in this case. Instead,
the central question is what standard of review the courts of
this state should apply when called upon to evaluate an
agency's interpretation of a statute. 85
The court repeated its past phrases about it not being bound by an
agency's legal conclusion, but in reaching its decision, the court explained
that deference to an agency decision on a question of law "is appropriate" if
the decision meets all of the following four factors: (1) the statute was one the
agency was charged by the legislature with administering; (2) the
interpretation of the agency was one of long-standing; (3) the agency used its
expertise or specialized knowledge in deciding the legal question presented;
and (4) the agency's interpretation provided uniformity in the application of
the statute. 86 Gone from the court's recitation was Pabst IT s requirement that
the application of the statute not conflict with the statute's legislative
history. 87 Instead the court concluded that great weight deference, where an
agency decision "must be affirmed" if it is "reasonable," should be applied,
instead of interpreting the statute to give it the meaning the legislature
intended.88 In one brief sentence, the court supported its decision to employ a
decision-avoidance device by reference to section 102.23(1)(e) of the
Wisconsin Statutes89  and to Lisney v. Labor & Industry Review
82. See id. at 122.
83. 539 N.W.2d 98 (Wis. 1995).
84. Id. at 101.
85. Id. at 102.
86. Id.
87. See Pabst II, 120 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Wis. 1963).
88. Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102.
89. Id. Section 102.23(1)(e) of the 1993-1994 Wisconsin Statutes provided the following:
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Commission.9" However, in Lisney the court explained that no deference is
given to LIRC's interpretation of a statute if that interpretation "contravenes
the words of the statute, is clearly contrary to legislative intent, or is otherwise
unreasonable or without a rational basis" as such an interpretation would be
"in excess of' LIRC's powers. 91 Additionally, section 102.23, which was
employed in Harnischfeger, is applicable to judicial review of decisions
rendered under the worker's compensation act, which decisions are not
subject to review under chapter 227.92
The difference between a chapter 102 review and a chapter 227 review
could have been significant because section 102.23(1) of the Wisconsin
Statutes 93 permits a more limited review, in contrast to that set out in section
227.57 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 94 In a chapter 102 review of legal decisions
(e) Upon such hearing, the court may confirm or set aside such order or award;
and any judgment which may theretofore have been rendered thereon; but the
same shall be set aside only upon the following grounds:
1. That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers.
2. That the order or award was procured by fraud.
3. That the findings of fact by the commission do not support the order
or award.
WIS. STAT. 102.23(l)(e) (1993-1994).
90. 493 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1992).
91. Id. at 16.
92. WIS. STAT. § 102.23(1) (2003-2004).
93. Section 102.23(1)(e) of the Wisconsin Statutes states in relevant part:
[T]he court may confirm or set aside such order or award; and any judgment
which may theretofore have been rendered thereon; but the same shall be set
aside only upon the following grounds:
1. That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers.
2. That the order or award was procured by fraud.
3. That the findings of fact by the commission do not support the order or
award.
WIS. STAT. § 102.23(1)(e) (2003-2004).
94. Section 227.57 of the Wisconsin Statutes states in relevant part:
(3) The court shall separately treat disputed issues of agency procedure,
interpretations of law, determinations of fact or policy within the agency's
exercise of delegated discretion.
(4) The court shall remand the case to the agency for further action if it
finds that either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action
has been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow
prescribed procedure ....
(6) If the agency's action depends on any fact found by the agency in a
contested case proceeding, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact. The
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by an agency, the court examines only whether the commission acted without
or in excess of its powers, while in a chapter 227 review the court examines
whether the decision of the agency contravenes a constitutional or statutory
provision. However, as will be shown below, the differences in the scope of
review under chapter 102 and that provided under chapter 227 have been
melded into a broad grant of deference to state agency final decisions.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's use of great weight deference, an
extraordinary level of deference by a law-declaring court to another tribunal's
conclusion of law, has grown over time. For example, in Hutchinson
Technology, Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission95 and also in
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor & Industry Review Commission,96 the
court cited Harnischfeger, a chapter 102 worker's compensation case, as
support for applying great weight deference to chapter 11 1 WFEA claims that
are reviewed under chapter 227. The court provided no discussion of why the
reviews completed under different chapters of the statutes should be treated
the same.
97
In Crystal Lake Cheese, the court examined a claim brought under the
WFEA by a woman who said she was discriminated against because she was
disabled.98 It was undisputed that, even with modifications to the workplace,
the claimant could not do all the tasks that the job required. 99 However,
because other workers volunteered to do the tasks she could not do, LIRC
determined that was a reasonable accommodation under section 11 .34(1)(b)
of the Wisconsin Statutes, resulting in the legal conclusion that the Crystal
Lake Cheese Factory had discriminated against the employee due to a
disability, contrary to the provisions of section 111 .34(2)(a) of the Wisconsin
Statutes. 1 00
court shall, however set aside agency action . . . if it finds that the agency's
action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record ....
(8) The court shall reverse or remand the case to the agency if. . . [the
agency's exercise of discretion] is otherwise in violation of a constitutional or
statutory provision ....
WIS. STAT. § 227.57 (2003-2004).
95. 2004 WI 90, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 682 N.W.2d 343.
96. 2003 WI 106, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651.
97. See Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, T 22, 273 Wis. 2d 394, T 22, 682 N.W.2d 343, 7 22;
Crystal Lake Cheese, 2003 WI 106,$ 28, 264 Wis. 2d 200, T 28, 664 N.W.2d 651,1 28.
98. Crystal Lake Cheese, 2003 WI 106, TT 73-74, 264 Wis. 2d 200, TT 73-74, 664 N.W.2d 651,
7773-74.
99. Id., T 78, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 7 78, 664 N.W.2d 651, 7 78.
100. Id., T 81,264 Wis. 2d200, 81,664N.W.2d651, T 81.
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As noted above, reviews of LIRC decisions arising from contested case
hearings on WFEA claims are conducted under chapter 227, yet the Crystal
Lake Cheese opinion cited Harnischfeger, a chapter 102 case, and chose its
highly deferential standard of review.'°l  By way of explanation for the
deference given, the court said that LIRC's decision would "be given great
weight [deference] due to [its] knowledge and experience in application of
Wis. Stat. § 111.34. "12 The court did not explain why LIRC's interpretation
of the terms "reasonable accommodation" in section 11 1.34(1)(b) to include a
plan by which the employee did not have to do all the tasks the job required
was based on "specialized knowledge" that LIRC had or that its interpretation
in that regard was of long standing, as Harnischfeger originally required. 103
Because the court chose to apply great weight deference, the court
acknowledged that even if it concluded that another interpretation of the
statute at issue was more reasonable than that chosen by LIRC, it would still
be obligated to accept LIRC's decision. 104 The court did not explain why the
public interest is better served by LIRC's determination than by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's analysis of the facts and the law or why this self-
imposed limit on the court's analysis supported the court's major function: to
declare what the law is. In so doing, the court continued a trend of applying
great weight deference more and more often, thereby construing statutes less
and less frequently.
Furthermore, no case has discussed the different tasks an agency performs
when it applies the facts found to an unambiguous statute as compared with
an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute and then the application of
that interpretation to the facts found. Yet, there is a difference. Query: what
gives an agency greater expertise than the courts to determine the meaning of
a statute? In addition, there are times when that "expertise" is illusory at best.
For example, when deference is given to an agency decision, it is applied
to the last decision by that agency, often an agency-commission with specific
responsibility for certain types of appeals. 105 For example, deference
generally is not given to the DWD; instead, deference is given to decisions of
LIRC, which is authorized to hear appeals involving issues arising from
contested cases heard by the DWD. 106 Furthermore, no deference is granted
to the decisions of the Department of Revenue but rather, it is accorded to the
101. Id., 28, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 28, 664 N.W.2d 651, 28.
102. Id., 264 Wis. 2d 200, 28, 664 N.W.2d 651, 28.
103. See Harnischfeger v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 539 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Wis. 1995).
104. Crystal Lake Cheese, 2003 WI 106, 30, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 30, 664 N.W.2d 651, 30.
105. See WIS. STAT. § 227.52 (2003-2004).
106. See id.; Beecher v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 88, 22, 273 Wis. 2d 136,
22, 682 N.W.2d 29, 22.
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Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission's decisions.107 However, there are times
when the court applies the greatest level of deference to the legal conclusions
of a single hearing examiner of unknown experience or expertise. For
example, the court has held that because the Family Medical Leave Act
provides a direct appeal of the hearing examiner's decision to the circuit
court, the hearing examiner's decision is the final agency decision. After
noting this in Jicha v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations,
Equal Rights Division'08 the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted great weight
deference to a single person, the hearing examiner. The oft-cited foundation
for deferring to agency decisions, administrative expertise, 10 9 is not readily
apparent in Jicha because there was no way of knowing whether that
particular hearing examiner had any experience at all, yet deference due to
agency experience and expertise was part of the court's rationale. 
110
This trend of deferring to the legal conclusions of a single hearing
examiner, rather than to a commission or commissioner with specialized
agency knowledge, has a troublesome potential for expansion because appeals
from the decisions of at least four different administrative agencies may be
brought before a hearing examiner in the Division of Hearings and Appeals of
the Department of Administration. 1 ' Division hearing examiners do not have
the usual agency expertise in applying facts to a statutory standard or in
interpreting the controlling statute. However, a factor in all supreme court
decisions to defer to an agency is the presumed expertise that the agency has
in a specialized area. 112  Hearing examiners working in the Division of
Hearings and Appeals are required by statute to be assigned to differing
subject areas on a rotating basis to the extent practicable, although the
Division may have "pools" of examiners that hear certain subjects.' 13
Hearing examiners have no policy authority for any given agency, but rather
provide certain adjudicative functions. 114  On more than one occasion, the
court of appeals has refused to defer to the legal conclusion of a Division
107. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 586 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Wis. 1998).
108. Jicha v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div., 485 N.W.2d 256,
258-60 (Wis. 1992).
109. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 515-16 (3d ed. 1972).
110. Jicha, 485 N.W.2d at 259.
S11. See Wis. STAT. § 227.43(1)(b) (2003-2004) (regarding the assignment of Division
Hearing Examiners to appeals from the decisions of the Department of Natural Resources);
§ 227.43(1)(br) (regarding appeals from decisions of the Department of Transportation);
§ 227.43(1)(bu) (regarding appeals from decisions of the Department of Health and Family
Services); § 227.43(1)(by) (regarding appeals from decisions of the Department of Workforce
Development).
112. See William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 500 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Wis. 1993).
113. See § 227.43(lg).
114. See generally § 227.43.
20061
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
hearing examiner, after analyzing whether deference was merited because of
the lack of expertise and policy authority.115 However, when a line agency
adopts the decision of a Division hearing examiner, the court of appeals has
given deference similar to that which it would have granted if the decision had
been issued from the agency. 1 6 Thus far the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
not addressed whether it will give deference to some, none, or all of the legal
conclusions of the Division's hearing examiners. 117 However, if Jicha"8 is
any indication, deference may be the rule, not the exception.
Additionally, the history of at least some of the agencies to which the
court defers does not support the conclusion that agency expertise is superior
to the court's expertise. For example, from 1979 to 2004, the average length
of a commissioner's service on LIRC, an agency-commission to which
deference is often given, was 3.7 years. 1 9  In that capacity, three
commissioners issue decisions for claims made under workers compensation,
unemployment compensation, and WEFA, with an average total experience of
only twelve years. 120
Going back to the beginning of my discussion and Pabst II, there,
deference to an agency's conclusion of law was referenced in dicta as only a
possibility, a choice that the court was not closing the door on for future
opinions, which was not suitable for its decision in the case at hand.
However, deference now appears to come very close to being required, under
115. See Wis. Comm'r of Ins. v. Fiber Recovery, Inc., 2004 WI App 183, 15, 276 Wis. 2d
495, 15, 687 N.W.2d 755, 15 (concluding no deference is due to a decision of the Division because
it has no expertise in interpreting chapter 605 of the Wisconsin Statutes or insurance contracts);
Artac v. Dep't of Health & Family Serv., 2000 WI App 88, 13, 234 Wis. 2d 480, 13, 610 N.W.2d
115, 13 (giving no deference to the Division's decision because the Division has no expertise in
administering the Medical Assistance program); Roehl Transp., Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals,
570 N.W.2d 864, 868-69 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (giving no deference to a decision of the Division
because it is neither the line agency that is charged by the legislature with administration and
enforcement of section 341.45 of the Wisconsin Statutes nor the final administrative authority with
responsibility for policy determinations of a line agency).
116. See Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 588 N.W.2d 667, 672
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that because the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), by
administrative rule, decided that when the DNR did not appeal a decision of the Division's hearing
examiner, that decision became the decision of the DNR, great weight deference was due).
117. But see Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2005 WI App 6,
278 Wis. 2d 508, 692 N.W.2d 670 (petition for review granted March 8, 2005, where the issue of the
level of deference due a Division's decision is squarely presented).
118. See Jicha v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, Equal Rights Div., 485 N.W.2d
256, 258-60 (Wis. 1992).
119. See Appendix D, infra, for a listing of the LIRC commissioners and the number of years
each has served, 1979-2004.
120. As of 2005, the justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court have been working as judges for
a combined total of 132 years: Abrahamson, C.J., 29 years; Wilcox, J., 26 years; Bradley, J., 20
years; Crooks, J., 28 years; Prosser, J., 7 years; Roggensack, J., 9 years; and Butler, J., 13 years.
Additionally, all of the justices have extensive legal experience beyond their experience as judges.
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current supreme court cases. The decisions in Crystal Lake Cheese and
Hutchinson Technology represent how the court is most apt to apply decision-
avoidance doctrines in regard to agency legal conclusions.
The court's decision often is driven by the level of deference that is
applied, and the level of deference may be pre-determined by how the court
frames the central issue. For example, in regard to LIRC's interpretation of
the statutes in Crystal Lake, the court set the issue as "whether LIRC
reasonably interpreted [section 1 1 1.34(1)(b) and section 1 1 1.34(2)(a)] of the
WFEA when it found that there was a reasonable accommodation Crystal
Lake could have provided its former employee." 121 Framing the issue in that
manner presumes that great weight deference will be given, before the court
even begins its analysis. That is, by asking whether LIRC's statutory
interpretations were "reasonable," rather than asking if the plan proposed by
the employee was sufficient to satisfy the requirements set by the legislature
in both sections 11 1.34(l)(b) and (2)(a), the court further limits its own
analysis of LIRC's statutory interpretation and application.
When the court employs a mantra rather than an analysis of the facts and
the law, it never explains how the statutes at issue were meant by the
legislature to further legislative purposes. 122 Additionally, when analysis of
whether the facts found reasonably meet the statutory standard was first
articulated by the court, the legal conclusion had to be reasonable according to
the language of the statute, the statute's legislative history, and consistent with
prior judicial interpretations and relevant constitutional provisions. 123 All of
the analysis that was anticipated in Pabst II if deference were to be granted is
now forgone. 124 The mantra of great weight deference is substituted for the
judicial reasoning that should tie the facts found to the law the legislature
enacted. 125
This depth of deference to agency decisions leaves open several questions
121. Crystal Lake Cheese, 2003 WI 106, 22, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 22, 664 N.W.2d 651, 22.
122. See Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 50-52, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 50-52, 682 N.W.2d
343, IT 50-52 (Roggensack, J. dissenting).
123. Pabst 11, 120 N.W.2d 77, 82-83 (Wis. 1963).
124. See Hutchinson Tech., 2004 WI 90, 24 n.9, 273 Wis. 2d 394, 24 n.9, 682 N.W.2d 343,
T 24 n.9.
125. See id., 23-24, 273 Wis. 2d 394, T$ 23-24, 682 N.W.2d 343, TT 23-24 (setting out the
mantra of deferral: "LIRC is charged with adjudicating appeals from the hearing examiner's decision
on complaints under the WFEA .... LIRC has developed experience and expertise in interpreting
this section .... Third .... we will promote greater uniformity and consistency than if we did not do
so. Fourth, this determination is intertwined with factual determinations. Fifth, this determination
involves value and policy judgments about the obligations of employers and employees when an
employee, or prospective employee, has a handicap .... [W]e reaffirm our conclusion in Crystal
Lake that LIRC's determination regarding reasonable accommodation should be given great weight
deference.").
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that affect the public interest: Who will regulate the regulating agencies, if the
Wisconsin Supreme Court defers? Who looks out for the public's interest in a
fair decision, made according to the law, if the Wisconsin Supreme Court
defers? And most importantly, is there any actual, meaningful review of an
agency's legal decision when the Wisconsin Supreme Court applies great
weight deference?
V. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court is comprised of seven members who were
elected by the people of Wisconsin to review the decisions of other tribunals
and to determine whether a fair decision under the applicable rule of law was
made. When the court employs judicially created doctrines that limit the
scope of its review instead of applying the collective knowledge that the
seven justices were elected to exercise, it avoids the real work of appellate
decision making: explaining to the public why the application of the law to
the facts of the case resulted in the court's decision and why that result is fair
under the law. Because of the extraordinary deference that is currently
accorded to agency legal decisions under the standard of great weight
deference, I suggest that at least in this area, it may be appropriate for the
court to re-examine its use of judicially created limits on its own review.
After all, the members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court were elected to
decide. The court has the depth of knowledge and diversity of perspectives
that will benefit the public interest, if the court chooses to address the merits
of the issues in more of the cases it accepts for review.
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APPENDIX A
Doctrine Example of When Decision
Employed
Deference to Receipt or exclusion of State v. Alsteen, 324
discretionary decision evidence N.W.2d 426 (Wis.
of circuit court 1982).
Sentencing State v. Gallion, 2004
WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d
535, 678 N.W.2d 197.
Structure of jury Meurer v. ITT Gen.
instructions Controls, 280 N.W.2d
156 (Wis. 1979).
Great weight deference Conclusions of law Crystal Lake Cheese
to agency Factory v. Labor &
Indus. Review
Comm'n, 2003 WI 106,
264 Wis. 2d 200, 664
N.W.2d 651.
Due weight deference to Conclusions of law Mallo v. Dep't of
agency Revenue, 2002 WI 70,
253 Wis. 2d 391, 645
N.W.2d 853.
Waiver Not raised at circuit State v. Carprue, 2004
court WI 111,274 Wis. 2d
656, 683 N.W.2d 31.
Mootness Lack of legislative Wis. Envtl. Decade, Inc.
action v. Joint Comm. for
Review of Admin.
Rules, 243 N.W.2d 497
(Wis. 1976).
2006)
MARQUETTE LA WREVIEW
APPENDIX B
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 2003-2004 TERM
Case name
and citation
Brown v. Labor & Indus. Review
Comm'n, 2003 WI 142, 267 Wis.
2d 31, 671 N.W.2d 279.
McCormick v. Schubring, 2003 WI
149, 267 Wis. 2d 141, 672 N.W.2d
63.
Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, 268
Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832.
Town of Delafield v. Winkelman,
2004 WI 17, 269 Wis. 2d 109, 675
N.W.2d 470.
State v. Walters, 2004 WI 18, 269
Wis. 2d 142, 675 N.W.2d 778.
Rohde-Giovanni v. Baumgert, 2004
WI 27, 269 Wis. 2d 598, 676
N.W.2d 452.
State v. Gary M.B., 2004 WI 33,
270 Wis. 2d 62, 676 N.W.2d 475.
State v. Franklin, 2004 WI 38, 270
Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276.
AFFIRMANCE THROUGH
AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE
Great weight deference to agency
decision
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Waiver
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
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Case name
and citation
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.
Weber v. White, 2004 WI 63, 272
Wis. 2d 121, 681 N.W.2d 137.
State v. McDowell, 2004 WI 70,
272 Wis. 2d 488, 681 N.W.2d 500.
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, 273
Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524.
State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 85, 273
Wis. 2d 250, 682 N.W.2d 12.
Hutchinson Tech. v. Labor & Indus.
Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 90, 273
Wis. 2d 394, 682 N.W.2d 343.
State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz,
2004 WI 96, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 681
N.W.2d 914.
Haase v. Badger Mining Corp.,
2004 WI 97, 274 Wis. 2d 143, 682
N.W.2d 389.
State v. Deilke, 2004 WI 104, 274
Wis. 2d 595, 682 N.W.2d 945.
AFFIRMANCE THROUGH
AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Waiver
Waiver and great weight deference
to agency decision
Waiver
Whether circuit court was "clearly
wrong" in its decision to dismiss
for insufficient evidence
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
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Case name
and citation
State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, 274
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433.
State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, 274
Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31.
Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac,
Inc., 2004 WI 112, 275 Wis. 2d 1,
683 N.W.2d 58.
AFFIRMANCE THROUGH
AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
Waiver
Deferral to circuit court's
discretion
The court issued eighty-three authored decisions and applied a doctrine
that limited its review of the merits of one or more issues in twenty (24%) of
them.
APPENDIX C
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 2004-2005 TERM
Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. PSC, 2005
WI 93, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700
N.W.2d 768
Great weight deference to the
agency
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APPENDIX D
LIRC COMMISSIONERS
YEARS SERVED NAME YEARS OF SERVICE
2 Hayon 1979-81
4 Hart 1979-83
3 Ausman 1979-82
8 Anderson 1983-84; 1989-93; 1993-96
4 Pearson 1983-87
6 Henderson 1983-89
6 Thompson 1985-91
2 Potter 1991-93
2 Meier 1993-95
4 Kreul 1993-97
7 Falstad 1997-2004
4 Rutkowski 1999-2003
2 McCallum 2001-03
1 Flynn 2003-04
1 Glaser 2003-04
56 years total + 15 people = 3.7 years, average length of service
* * *
